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  R
ecognizing the potential 
severe impact of pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) urges every 
country to develop or maintain an up-
to-date national inﬂ  uenza preparedness 
plan, and provides guidance on 
plan content [1]. WHO guidance 
focuses on numerous issues, from 
surveillance and communications to 
prioritization of vaccine. Despite the 
perceived imminence of this threat, 
WHO estimated that as of December 
2005, only 40 countries had developed 
written plans [2]. Among these plans, 
there was a great deal of variation with 
respect to comprehensiveness, quality, 
and stage of completion [3].
  Prioritizing  Scarce  Resources
    Prioritization of scarce pharmaceutical 
resources (e.g., vaccines and antiviral 
medications) that could ultimately 
delay the spread of a pandemic or 
lower overall incidence is of particular 
importance to planning at the 
national level. Because of costs and 
manufacturing limitations, these critical 
resources are likely to be scarce and will 
require evidence-based rationing. At 
current capacity, we cannot expect to 
vaccinate more than 14% of the world’s 
population within a year of a pandemic 
[4]. Similarly, although manufacturing 
capacity has recently quadrupled, it is 
estimated to take a decade to produce 
enough of the antiviral medication 
oseltamivir for 20% of the world’s 
population [3]. Because estimates of 
global demand for these resources 
depend on the priorities of individual 
countries, priority setting at the 
national level is the ﬁ  rst step toward 
global preparedness [5].
    Until recently, developing countries 
were unlikely to secure supplies of 
oseltamivir. Today, generic drug 
manufacturers in Bangladesh, Algeria, 
India, and China produce oseltamivir, 
some for local use as determined in 
ofﬁ  cial agreements and some for use 
in areas without patent protection 
[6]. It seems that the world is entering 
a phase in which pharmaceutical 
interventions will not be limited to the 
developed world—e.g., by spring of 
2006, 65 countries had ordered stocks 
of oseltamivir [7]. Thus, prioritization 
is crucial for all nations. 
    Despite the growing availability of 
pharmaceutical resources, the planning 
community has yet to conduct a critical 
analysis of distribution strategies. A 
study from April 2006 that reviewed 
national pandemic inﬂ  uenza plans 
brieﬂ  y touched on prioritization 
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among a myriad of competing issues. 
Furthermore, it focused exclusively 
on the European region, reviewing 
a total of 21 plans [8]. Given the 
integral role of priority setting in the 
concept of preparedness and the 
ethical, political, and public health 
implications of deciding who receives 
potentially life-saving interventions, we 
sought to perform a targeted review of 
national pandemic inﬂ  uenza plans from 
developed and developing countries. We 
aim to describe the global variation in 
national-level prioritization of vaccines 
and antiviral medications, and to inform 
future priority-setting processes. Our 
search strategy is shown in Box 1.
  National  Preparedness  Plans
      Sample description.   We obtained a 
total of 50 pandemic inﬂ  uenza plans. 
We identiﬁ  ed these plans through Web 
sites that compile lists of plans (39 
plans), contacts at national inﬂ  uenza 
centers (ﬁ  ve plans), Google searches 
(ﬁ  ve plans), and personal contacts (one 
plan). We subsequently excluded three 
plans (Finland, Italy, and Sweden) 
that were not available in the selected 
languages, and two plans (Sierra Leone 
and Namibia) that focused exclusively 
on avian inﬂ  uenza preparedness. Our 
ﬁ  nal sample contained 45 national 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza plans, 19 from 
developed and 26 from developing 
nations (Box 2). 
    Three plans were from low-income 
nations, a World Bank–deﬁ  ned 
category with 59 total members. 
The subset sample (see Box 1 
for a description of this sample) 
contained 25 English-language 
plans that prioritized at least one 
pharmaceutical intervention. In total, 
the plans represented about 3.8 billion 
individuals, or roughly two-thirds of the 
world population. 
    The subset sample included one 
plan from Africa, one from Australia, 
three from North America, seven from 
Central and South America, 16 from 
Europe, and 17 from Asia–Paciﬁ  c. As 
of April 20, 2006, 18 (40%) nations 
had identiﬁ  ed cases of H5N1 in bird 
populations [9]. The date of pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza plan release, or publication, 
ranged from October 1997 (Japan) 
to January 2006 (Israel, Argentina, 
France, and Venezuela). There were 
28 (62%) plans dated after June 2005. 
Plans ranged in length from nine pages 
to 453 pages, with most in the 25–60 
page range.
      Prioritization description.   Goals of 
pharmaceutical interventions were 
recorded for 21 plans. Although the 
wording varied slightly, three goals 
  Table 1.   Prioritization Components of Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Plans: All Countries and by Development Status    
Components of Plans Both Developed Developing
 n  = 45  n  = 19  n  = 26
 Prioritization  Vaccine prioritized 28 (62%) 14 (74%) 14 (54%)
Antivirals prioritized 22 (49%) 12 (63%) 10 (38%)
Both vaccine and antivirals prioritized 19 (42%) 11 (58%) 8 (31%)
Neither vaccine nor antivirals prioritized 13 (29%) 3 (16%) 10 (38%)
  Prioritization in tiers  Vaccine prioritized in tiers 16 (36%) 6 (32%) 10 (38%)
Antivirals prioritized in tiers 9 (20%) 5 (26%) 4 (15%)
 Antiviral  strategy  a  Treatment of cases over prevention 11(50%) 7 (58%) 4 (40%)
Prevention over treatment of cases 4 (18%) 2 (17%) 2 (20%)
  a  Among nations that prioritize antivirals (total of 22 nations).
  DOI:  10.1371/journal.pmed.0030436.t001 
    We searched for pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
plans on ofﬁ  cial Web sites that compile 
planning documents (e.g., http://www.
who.int and http://www.undg.org). 
We used Google to identify links to 
documents on ministry of health Web 
sites—search keywords included 
“pandemic,” “inﬂ  uenza” (as well as 
synonyms and foreign-language 
translations), “plan,” and names of 
countries. Lastly, we contacted the 
WHO National Inﬂ  uenza Centers for 83 
countries, and requested access to ofﬁ  cial 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza plans. The search 
process occurred between February 6, 
2006, and April 20, 2006.
    For the study, we included all 
plans that addressed human impact 
of pandemic inﬂ  uenza, regardless of 
whether it was available in draft or 
ﬁ  nal form, published or unpublished. 
Furthermore, the ofﬁ  cial plans of any 
self-governing territory—regardless 
of nationhood—were included. For 
the purpose of this Policy Forum, the 
term “nation” refers to both recognized 
countries and territories. We excluded 
documents that pertained solely to avian 
inﬂ  uenza preparedness and response. 
We also excluded plans that were not 
available in English, Spanish, French, or 
German.
    We designed a data abstraction form 
to guide a systematic exploration of 44 
plan variables. We selected variables with 
reference to WHO guidelines: vaccine 
and antiviral priority groups, rankings 
of groups, goals of pharmaceutical 
interventions, and the inclusion of 
modeled scenarios. For a subset of 
English-language plans that prioritized 
at least one pharmaceutical intervention, 
we collected data on rationales for 
prioritization, deﬁ  nitions of “high-risk” 
and “essential services” groups, and 
references to ethical considerations. In 
addition to extracting data from planning 
documents, we gathered national-level 
data on demographics (e.g., population 
size) from World Bank sources [15]. We 
classiﬁ  ed level of development according 
to the World Bank criteria, deﬁ  ning 
low- and medium-income nations as 
“developing” and high-income nations 
as “developed” [16]. Of the 45 plans 
that met inclusion criteria, 11 were 
not available in English translation. In 
these cases, the research team worked 
with experienced translators, who 
orally translated relevant sections. 
We used STATA statistical software 
(College Station, Texas) and Microsoft 
Excel (Redmond, Washington) for data 
management and analysis.  
  Box 1. Search Strategy for Identifying National Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza 
Plans
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appeared in various combinations. 
These goals were reduction of 
morbidity and mortality (21 plans), 
continued maintenance of essential 
services (13 plans), and minimization 
of social and economic impacts (13 
plans). Within their plans, 18 (40%) 
nations—15 developed and three 
developing—included a modeled 
scenario to estimate pandemic impact 
in terms of morbidity and mortality. 
Estimated attack rates ranged from 
10% (Ireland, Thailand, and the 
United Kingdom) to 50% (Greece and 
the UK), with seven nations modeling 
several different attack-rate scenarios. 
Stated mortality rates ranged from 
0.37% to 2.5%, and four nations 
speciﬁ  cally based assumptions on worst-
case scenarios derived from the 1918 
pandemic. 
    There were 14 (74%) developed 
and 14 (54%) developing nations that 
prioritized population groups to receive 
vaccine in a pandemic (p = 0.18), and 
12 (63%) developed and 10 (38%) 
developing nations that prioritized 
population groups to receive antivirals 
(p = 0.10) (Table 1). No national plans 
included prioritization schemes for 
the distribution of nonpharmaceutical 
medical resources, such as ventilators 
or N95 masks.
    Of the 28 nations that prioritized 
vaccine, high-risk individuals were 
prioritized most frequently, followed 
by health-care workers and essential 
services workers—a category which 
may include health-care workers 
depending on a nation’s deﬁ  nition 
(Figure 1). Certain nations listed 
health-care workers independently, 
or alternatively chose to have the 
category of essential services represent 
a wide rage of workers including 
health-care personnel. Some nations 
grouped children and the elderly 
under the catch-all category of high-
risk individuals. In at least two plans, 
18 distinct high-risk groups appeared. 
For antiviral distribution, the major 
groups remained the same, but had 
a different ordering of health-care 
workers, essential services workers, and 
high-risk individuals (Figure 2). Among 
the nations that prioritized vaccine, 
13 (47%) included children in their 
schemes and 11 (39%) included key 
decision makers. 
    Three options guided the antiviral 
distribution strategies detailed in 
22 plans: pre-exposure prophylaxis, 
postexposure prophylaxis, and 
treatment of inﬂ  uenza cases within 48 
hours of onset of illness. Seven (32%) 
nations did not differentiate among 
these strategies in allocating resources. 
Eleven (50%) plans indicated that the 
treatment of cases would be preferred 
over prophylaxis for groups such as 
health-care workers. Among the four 
nations that allocated antivirals for 
prophylaxis over treatment, two were 
from the developing world. The UK 
plan, which prioritized treatment over 
prophylaxis, reasoned that long-term 
prevention at the population level 
was not an efﬁ  cient use of resources. 
Serbia’s plan prioritized prophylaxis 
because the 48-hour time window 
required for effective treatment was 
considered too narrow.
    Health-care workers were consistently 
ranked at the top of the vaccine and 
antiviral priority lists (Table 2). Eleven 
nations (73% of nations that ranked) 
prioritized health-care workers as Tier 1 
for vaccine distribution, and six nations 
(67%) prioritized this group as Tier 1 
for antiviral distribution. After Tier 1, 
there was greater variability in groups 
that fell into the subsequent tiers. 
For vaccine Tier 2, six nations (40%) 
prioritized essential services workers. 
For antiviral Tier 2, three nations 
(33%) prioritized health-care workers, 
and two (22%) prioritized essential 
services workers. Seven (44%) nations 
used the following tiered vaccine 
scheme: (1) health-care workers, (2) 
essential services workers, and (3) high-
risk patients. All other orderings were 
unique.
    Of the 25 subset plans, 14 described 
the composition of the high-risk 
category (Table 3). Twelve plans 
included immunocompromised 
individuals in this category. The other 
most common members of the high-
risk category were individuals with 
cardiovascular disease (11 plans) and 
the elderly (10 plans). The composition 
of the essential services group was 
also described in plans. The most 
common members of this group were 
communications/telecommunications 
workers (15 plans), ﬁ  re ﬁ  ghters (14 
plans), and energy/power supply 
workers (14 plans.)
      Rationales for prioritization.   Of 25 
plans, 13 (52%) provided rationales for 
the inclusion of certain priority groups. 
Two plans explained the exclusion 
of certain groups (e.g., children and 
families of health-care workers). Plans 
justiﬁ  ed the prioritization of health-
care workers for the following reasons: 
(1) they are at increased risk of 
acquiring infection and/or passing it to 
vulnerable patients (Australia, Bahrain, 
Czech Republic, Israel, the UK, and 
the United States); (2) they perform 
essential services, enable the treatment 
of those affected by disease, and are 
required for quality medical care and 
good patient outcomes (Australia, 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030436.g002
  Figure 2.   Antiviral Priority Groups by Development Status—Listed in at Least Two National 
Plans  
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Bahrain, Canada, Ireland, Israel, 
Serbia, Montenegro, the UK, and the 
US); and (3) their availability reduces 
morbidity and mortality (Australia, 
Bahrain, Canada, and Ireland).
    Furthermore, plans justiﬁ  ed 
the inclusion of children for the 
following reasons: (1) since children 
transmit inﬂ  uenza, prioritizing this 
group is consistent with the goal of 
containment (Australia, Bahrain, and 
Norway), and (2) children may have 
a great risk of infection and severe 
illness depending on the circulating 
strain (Brazil and Thailand). Canada’s 
plan explained its exclusion of 
children, stating that this group is at 
the lowest risk of developing severe 
outcomes from inﬂ  uenza during 
annual epidemics, and absence from 
school does not have the direct 
economic impact that illness in adults 
has. The US plan excluded children 
because in prior pandemics and 
epidemics, this group has been at low 
risk for hospitalization and death.
  Discussion
    This study provides the ﬁ  rst description 
of pandemic inﬂ  uenza prioritization 
decisions in both the developed and 
the developing world. Although WHO 
recommends that nations set priority 
groups for both vaccine and antiviral 
distribution [5], about 30% prioritized 
neither resource.
    Fewer nations prioritized antivirals 
(49%) than vaccine (62%). This is an 
unexpected ﬁ  nding since antivirals 
may be the ﬁ  rst  —and, perhaps, the 
only—pharmaceutical intervention 
available to many countries in a 
pandemic [10]. Because it is estimated 
to take six months to mass produce 
strain-speciﬁ  c vaccine, and global 
antiviral production and stockpiling is 
increasing, priority setting for antivirals 
may prove to be more critical to 
pandemic preparedness. It is becoming 
increasingly essential for nations to 
attend to both allocation schemes 
in their plans, and the planning 
community can support this effort by 
emphasizing the relative importance of 
antiviral medications. 
    The nations that prioritized vaccines 
and antivirals varied considerably in 
their allocation decisions, and in several 
instances, chose to deviate from WHO 
guidelines. This variation cannot be 
explained with respect to stated goals; 
rather, we must look to differences 
in interpretation of evidence or 
sociocultural factors. It seems nations 
were equally divided with respect 
to children, with 47% prioritizing 
children for vaccine against WHO 
recommendations. WHO states, “There 
is no evidence that the use of inactivated 
vaccine in children will reduce the 
spread of a pandemic in the community, 
and this strategy is not recommended” 
[5]. The decision to prioritize children 
(although in a rather low rank, Tiers 3–
7) may reﬂ  ect differing interpretations 
of evidence. While evidence from 
clinical trials and observational studies 
remain unclear, two recent modeling 
studies indicated that vaccinating 
children may reduce inﬂ  uenza 
transmission in the community [11,12]. 
    Since these models were not 
available when most of the plans were 
written, the decision to prioritize 
children may also reﬂ  ect different 
sociocultural values, suggesting that 
purely epidemiology-based guidelines 
are insufﬁ  cient in priority setting. 
  Table 2.   Selected Vaccine and Antiviral Prioritization Groups   
Groups Number of Times 
Ranked for Vaccinea
Mode Vaccine Rank 
(Rank Range)a
Number of Times Ranked 
for Antiviral
Mode Antiviral Rank (Rank Range)
Health-care workers 13 Tier 1 (Tiers 1 and 2) 9 Tier 1 (Tiers 1 and 2)
Essential services 14 Tier 2 (Tiers 1–7) 6 Tier 3 (Tiers 2–4)
High risk 12 Tier 3 (Tiers 1–5) 6 Tier 3 (Tiers 3–5)
Children 5 Tier 4 (Tiers 3–7) 3 Tiers 4, 6, and 7 (Tiers 4  –7)
Elderly 5 Tier 5 (Tiers 3–6) 3 Tier 5 (Tiers 5 and 6)
Key decision makers 2 Tiers 1 and 3 (Tiers 1–3) 1 Tier 7 (Tier 7)
Inﬂ  uenza cases 0 2 Tiers 1 and 2 (Tiers 1 and 2)
Hospitalized cases 0 2 Tier 1 (Tier 1)
Unvaccinated 0 1 Tier 2 (Tier 2)
  a  Tiered ranks exclude US due to extremely detailed level of prioritization.
  DOI:  10.1371/journal.pmed.0030436.t002 
  Table 3.   List and Frequency of Common Members of “High Risk” and “Essential 
Services” Categories in 25 Plans (Prioritized by At Least Two Nations)   
Common Members of “High-Risk” 
Category (Number)
Common Members of “Essential Services” 
Category (Number)
Immunocompromiseda (12) Communications/telecommunications (15)
Cardiovascular diseasea (11) Fire ﬁ  ghtersa (14)
Elderlya (10) Energy/power supply (14)
Chronic pulmonary conditionsa (10) Police (13)a
Diabetes/metabolic diseasea (8) Water supply (13)
Renal disease/failurea (7) Transportation (12)
Nursing home residents (7) Morgue/funeral/undertakers (11)
Pregnant women (5) Health-care workersa (9)
Asthma (4) Food supply (9)
Treated with acetylsalicylic acid (4) Security/armed forces (9)
Children (3) Sanitation/sewer (8)
Chronically ill (3) Key government decision makers (8)
Organ transplant (3) Pharmaceuticalsa (7)
Infants (2) Laboratory personnel (5)
HIV positive (2) Emergency medical services (5)
Cystic ﬁ  brosis (2) Emergency services (4)
Malignant disease (2) Public servants (4)
Haemoglobinopathy (2) Corrections (prison staff/residents) (3)
  a  Groups explicitly mentioned in WHO guidelines.
  DOI:  10.1371/journal.pmed.0030436.t003 
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Planners can speciﬁ  cally research and 
consider alternatives to preferential 
vaccination that both recognize the 
moral imperative to prioritize children 
and achieve optimal public health 
impact. (The academic literature 
has begun to discuss this ethical 
question. A recent article by Emanuel 
and Wertheimer argued in favor of 
prioritizing individuals between early 
adolescence and middle age, contrary 
to existing recommendations [13].) 
    It is notable that despite the inﬂ  uence 
of sociocultural factors on decisions, 
priority-setting rationales always referred 
to epidemiology-based arguments. None 
of the plans prioritized children as a 
special group in need of protection, and 
plans seldom mentioned ethics in the 
context of resource allocation. Within 
the 25 plan subset, only ﬁ  ve referred 
to concepts of equity and fairness in 
allocation decisions, and two referred to 
consultation with ethicists.
    In the absence of an explicit WHO 
guideline, more than half the nations 
that prioritized vaccine distribution 
developed a tiered (ranked) strategy, 
revealing another example of variation. 
It may seem that the more well 
developed a ranked prioritization 
scheme is, the more prepared a 
nation is to deal with resource scarcity; 
however, the use of tiers may have both 
positive and negative consequences 
in view of the uncertainty associated 
   Argentina  (2006)a
   Australia  (June 2005) http://www.health.
gov.au/internet/wcms/publishing.nsf/
Content/ohp-pandemic-ahmppi.htm
   Austria  (September 2005) http://www.
bmgf.gv.at/cms/site/attachments/3/6/8/
CH0019/CMS1126084167391/
pandemieplanh3neu.pdf
   Bahrain  (November 2005) http://ai.moh.
gov.bh/BahrainPlan.asp
   Bolivia  (October 2005)a
   Brazil  (September 2005) http://portal.
saude.gov.br/portal/arquivos/pdf/
plano_ﬂ  u_english.pdf
   Canada  (September 2004) http://www.
phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/index.html
   Chile  (September 2005) http://www.
minsal.cl/ici/pandemiainﬂ  uenza/
pandemiainﬂ  uenza.html
   China  (Unlisted) http://www.undg.org/
content.cfm?id=1598
   Cuba  (October 2005) http://www.undg.
org/content.cfm?id=1552
   Czech  Republic  (April 2004) http://www.
who.int/csr/disease/inﬂ  uenza/czechplan.
pdf
   Fiji  (November 2005)a
   France  (January 2006) http://www.
grippeaviaire.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/
Plan_version_anglaise.pdf
   Germany  (July 2005) http://www.rki.
de/cln_006/nn_225576/DE/Content/
InfAZ/I/Inﬂ  uenza/inﬂ  uenza__node.
html__nnn=true
   Greece  (October 2005) http://www.who.
int/csr/disease/inﬂ  uenza/nationalgreece.
pdf
   Hong  Kong  (February 2005) http://www.
chp.gov.hk/ﬁ  les/pdf/
ﬂ  u_plan_framework_en_20050222.pdf
   Hungary  (September 2003) http://www.
who.int/csr/disease/inﬂ  uenza/
Pandemic_preparedness_plan_Hungary.
pdf
   India  (December 2005) http://www.
undg.org/content.cfm?id=1684
   Ireland  (2002) http://www.doh.ie/
pdfdocs/panﬂ  u.pdf
   Israel  (January 2006)a
   Japan  (October 1997) http://www.mhlw.
go.jp/english/topics/inﬂ  uenza/index.
html
   Lithuania  (Sept 2005)a http://www.vvspt.
lt/aktai/gripas/
  2005%2009%2020%20GRIPO%
20PLANO%20VERT.doc
   Mexico  (Unlisted) http://www.dgepi.
salud.gob.mx/pandemia/planpp.htm
   Montenegro  (October 2005) http://www.
mzdravlja.cg.yu/
vijesti.php?akcija=rubrika&rubrika=188
   Nauru  (Aug 2005) http://www.spc.int/
phs/PPHSN/Outbreak/Inﬂ  uenza/
Pand-Preparedness-plans-Paciﬁ  c-countries.
htm
   New  Caldonia  (October 2005) 
http://www.dass.gouv.nc/
static/infoPratique/documents/
PandemieGrippePlanActionNouvelle
Caledonie20042005version131005.PDF
   New  Zealand  (November 2005) http://
www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/ea6005dc347
e7bd44c2566a40079ae6f/
5f5694e4a5736dd2cc256c55000788a3?
OpenDocument
   Norway  (July 2003) http://www.dep.no/
archive/hdvedlegg/01/08/Inﬂ  u041.pdf
   Palau  (October 2005) http://www.spc.
int/phs/PPHSN/Outbreak/Inﬂ  uenza/
Palau_Flu_Plan_Final_Draft_103105.pdf
   Philippines  (October 2005) http://www.
undg.org/content.cfm?id=1671
   Poland  (2005) http://www.gis.gov.pl/
index.php?option=com_content&task=
category&sectionid=10&id=28&Itemid=
61&lang=iso-8859-2
   Serbia  (October 2005) http://www.
zdravlje.sr.gov.yu/downloads/pdf_e/
Inﬂ  uenza%20Preparedness%20Plan.pdf
   Singapore  (December 2005) http://www.
moh.gov.sg/corp/hottopics/inﬂ  uenza/
detail.do
   Slovak  Republic  (August 2001) http://
www.who.int/csr/disease/inﬂ  uenza/
Pand_Plan_SR_AJ.pdf
   South  Africa  (Unlisted) http://www.
undg.org/content.cfm?id=1528
   Spain  (May 2005) http://www.
msc.es/ciudadanos/enfLesiones/
enfTransmisibles/docs/PlanGripeIngles.
pdf
   Switzerland  (March 2005) http://www.
bag.admin.ch/inﬂ  uenza/01120/01134/
index.html
   Thailand  (May 2005) http://thaigcd.ddc.
moph.go.th/AI_Nationalplan_en_05_07.
html
   Timor  Leste  (November 2005) http://
www.undg.org/content.cfm?id=1551
   United  Kingdom  (October 2005) http://
www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/
EmergencyPlanning/PandemicFlu/fs/en
   Uruguay  (Unlisted) http://www.undg.
org/content.cfm?id=1572
   United  States  (November 2005) http://
www.hhs.gov/pandemicﬂ  u/plan
   Venezuela  (January 2006) http://www.
msds.gov.ve/msds/modules.php?name=
Content&pa=showpage&pid=422
   West  Bank/Gaza  (2005) http://www.
healthinforum.net/ﬁ  les/misc/
nat_avian_plan.pdf
   Yemen  (October 2005) http://www.undg.
org/content.cfm?id=1608
  a  Plan provided by National Inﬂ  uenza 
Centers or personal contacts. 
  Box 2. Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Plans: Country, Date of Publication/Release, and Web Site
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with the actual characteristics of an 
emerging pandemic. While prior 
discussion of groups and their relative 
importance can lead to greater public 
acceptance at the time of a pandemic, 
the effect of reordering groups to 
reﬂ  ect new evidence (during a crisis) 
is unclear. Emergency planners have 
further cautioned against planning in 
great detail in the face of uncertainty 
[14], an uncertainty evident in the wide 
variability in the deﬁ  nition of “high-
risk” individuals. Nations should assess 
the risk-communication implications of 
exhaustively detailed prioritization.
    Nations were urged by WHO to 
estimate the impact of a pandemic 
[5], yet only 40%—nearly all of which 
were developed nations—documented 
probable cases and/or deaths. We 
interpreted this to mean that priority 
setting is not consistently based on local 
conditions, or realities, especially in the 
case of the developing world. Nations 
should be encouraged and supported in 
priority setting based on individualized 
modeling or impact estimates.
    There was some notable variation in 
the prioritization of key government 
decision makers, such as politicians. 
Of the nations that prioritized vaccine, 
40% included key decision makers, 
and several more nations prioritized 
this group within the essential services 
category. Interestingly, when key 
decision makers appeared in rankings, 
this group ranked near the top of the 
list for vaccine (Tiers 1 and 3), but at 
the bottom for antivirals (Tier 7).
      Unresolved issues.   Our study 
highlights several unresolved issues. 
First, variation in priority setting may 
or may not represent a problem to be 
corrected, and may reﬂ  ect concrete 
variation in local conditions. If this is 
the case, nations may disregard further 
WHO guidance that is not country 
speciﬁ  c, in addition to evidence-based. 
    Second, nations should be clearer 
with respect to the different antiviral 
strategies of treatment and pre or 
postexposure prophylaxis. Seven of 22 
nations that prioritized antivirals did 
not differentiate among these strategies 
in allocating resources. Most countries 
that did differentiate, however, 
preferred treatment. 
    Third, if an antiviral stockpile is 
donated to a developing nation for the 
purpose of curbing a global pandemic 
at its source or for a humanitarian 
purpose, it is unclear at this time 
whether prioritization would follow a 
national prioritization scheme or one 
dictated by the donating body. Nations 
should plan for the use of national and 
potentially donated resources if they 
are willing to yield some control to a 
donating body.
    Finally, it is unclear why vaccine 
and antiviral medications have been 
singled out for prioritization when 
many critical resources are likely to 
be scarce. Further guidance should 
address whether additional schemes 
for ventilators, N95 masks, and hospital 
beds are necessary, and should explore 
the special considerations involved in 
their distribution.
      Limitations of our analysis.   Our 
study had several limitations. First, 
we were restricted to nonprobability 
sampling because it was unclear 
how many countries have in fact 
developed written pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
plans. Our search strategy may be 
less effective at capturing the plans 
of developing nations, which may 
not publish plans on the Internet. 
Second, pandemic inﬂ  uenza plans are 
dynamic documents in various stages 
of revision. Any analysis that takes a 
snapshot of the state of planning has 
a certain shelf-life. Third, it is unclear 
how well any description of the level 
of planning detail actually captures 
the concept of preparedness; many 
of the plans noted that prioritization 
schemes are subject to change based 
on emerging epidemiology and social 
conditions, thus emphasizing the 
fact that ﬂ  exibility is indispensable to 
preparedness. 
    Finally, because of variation in 
plan format, use of language, foreign-
language translation, and the subjective 
nature of any categorization of diverse 
elements, our ability to represent the 
intent of planners is limited. Because 
of limited resources, we were unable to 
contact planners in each country and 
verify ﬁ  ndings. In theory, however, the 
plans should stand as self-explanatory 
documents that clearly state pandemic 
policy. 
  Conclusion
    Attention to prioritization and its 
ethical implications may help to 
reduce death and disease burden, 
and minimize political destabilization 
and claims of injustice. Comparative 
analyses of national pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza plans provide a lens to 
reveal previously underaddressed 
considerations that can play a 
signiﬁ  cant role in international 
preparedness against this global 
infectious disease threat.   
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